We study the problem of fair allocation of m indivisible items among n agents with additive valuations using the popular notion of maximin share as our measure of fairness. The maximin share (MMS) of an agent is the maximum she can guarantee herself if she is allowed to choose a partition of items into n bundles (one for each agent), with the condition that all other agents get to choose a bundle before her. An MMS allocation provides each agent a bundle worth at least her maximin share. While it is known that such an allocation need not exist [14, 16] , a series of remarkable work [2, 4, 11, 15, 16] provided 2/3 approximation algorithms in which each agent receives a bundle worth at least 2/3 times her maximin share. Recently, in a groundbreaking work, [12] showed the existence of 3/4 MMS allocation and a PTAS to find a 3/4 − ϵ MMS allocation. Most of the previous work utilize intricate algorithms and require agents' approximate MMS values, which are computationally expensive to obtain.
INTRODUCTION
We study the problem of allocating m indivisible items among n agents with additive valuations in a fair manner. Fair division problems have been subject of intense study since the seminal work of Steinhaus [17] (1949) where he introduced the cake-cutting problem for n > 2 agents: Given a heterogeneous (divisible) cake and a set of agents with different valuation functions, the problem is to find a fair allocation. The two most well-studied notions of fairness are: 1) Envy-freeness, introduced by Foley [10] , where each agent prefers her own share of cake over any other agents' share, and 2) Proportionality, introduced by Steinhaus [17] , where each agent receives a share that is worth at least 1/n of her value for the entire cake.
In the case of indivisible items, however, no algorithm can provide either envy-freeness or proportionality, e.g., consider allocating a single item among n > 1 agents. This motivates the need for an alternate concept of fairness. Recently, Budish [8] introduced an intriguing option called maximin share, which has attracted a lot of attention [2, 4, 9, 11, 12, [14] [15] [16] . The idea is a straightforward generalization of the popular cut and choose protocol in the cake cutting problem and a natural relaxation of proportionality. Suppose we ask an agent i to partition the items into n bundles (one for each agent), with the condition that other n − 1 agents get to choose a bundle before her. In the worst case, i receives the least preferred bundle. Clearly, in such a situation, the agent will choose a partition that maximizes the value of her least preferred bundle. This maximum possible value is called i's maximin share (MMS) value. In fact, when all agents have the same valuations, i cannot guarantee more than the MMS value. We note that computing MMS value of an agent is an NP-hard problem 1 , but a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) exists [18] . Each agent's MMS value is a specific objective that gives her an intuitive local measure of the fairness of an allocation. This raises a natural question: Is there an allocation where each agent receives a bundle that is worth at least her MMS value? An allocation satisfying this property is said to be maximin share allocation (MMS allocation), and if it exists, it provides strong fairness guarantees to each individual agent. Bouveret and Lemaître [5] showed that an MMS allocation always exists in some restricted cases, e.g., when there are only two agents or if agents' valuations for items are either 0 or 1, but left the general case as an open problem.
Procaccia and Wang [16] 2 obtained the surprising result that MMS allocation might not exist, by means of a clever example. Furthermore, they showed that a 2/3 MMS allocation always exists, i.e., an allocation where each agent receives a bundle worth at least 2/3 of their MMS value, and they provided a polynomial time algorithm to find a 2/3 MMS allocation when the number of agents n is constant. For the special case of four agents, their algorithm finds a 3/4 MMS allocation. Amanatidis et al. [2] improved this result by addressing the requirement for a constant number of agents, obtaining a PTAS which finds a (2/3 − ϵ) MMS allocation for an arbitrary number of agents; see [15] for an alternate proof. [2] also showed that a 7/8 MMS allocation always exists when there are three agents. This factor was later improved to 8/9 in [13] .
Taking a different approach, Barman and Murthy [4] obtained a greedy algorithm to find a 2/3 MMS allocation. While their algorithm is fairly simple, the analysis is not. More recently, Garg et al. [11] obtained a simple algorithm to find a 2/3 MMS allocation that also has a simple analysis.
In a groundbreaking work, Ghodsi et al. [12] improved these results by showing the existence of a 3/4 MMS allocation and a PTAS to find a (3/4 −ϵ) MMS allocation. We note that the technique and analysis of their algorithm are quite involved.
Our Results and Techniques. We propose a simple algorithm to find a 3/4-MMS allocation by utilizing key ideas and insights from previous works. The running time of the entire procedure is O(n 5 m). Unlike [12] and other previous works, our algorithm does not need to compute agents' approximate MMS values, which is computationally expensive. This not only improves the previous best approximation factor by ϵ > 0 but also makes the algorithm likely to be more efficient in practice since the dependency on the number of items is just about linear.
For each agent, we first use the average value, that is the value of all items divided by the number of agents, as an upper bound of her MMS value, and then we greedily assign one, two, and three high-value items to an agent who values them at least 3/4 times her MMS value. After each assignment, we update the MMS value based on the new average. We call these Fixed Assignments because these assignments do not decrease the MMS values of remaining agents, so we do not need to reconsider them. This reduces the number of high-value items to at most twice the number of remaining agents. We note that the allocation of high-value items is the most challenging part of the problem, also observed by [11, 12] . In fact, [12] spends a major part of the paper in explaining the allocation of high-value items.
Next, we start tentative assignments, i.e., these are valid only if our current upper bound of the MMS values is tight enough. Then, we initialize a set of bags, one for each remaining agent, and put all high-value items in these bags in a particular way such that each bag has at most two highvalue items. If the current upper bound of MMS values is not tight enough for some agents, which we check using the total valuation of low-value items, then we update the MMS value of such an agent and repeat. We show that we do not need to update the MMS upper bounds more than O(n 3 ) times before we have a good upper bound on all MMS values. Once that happens, then we run a bag filling procedure, which is a generalized version of bag filling used in [12] to fill the bags with the low-value items such that each agent gets a bag worth at least 3/4 times her MMS value.
Further Related Work. Maximin share is a popular notion for the fair allocation of indivisible items among agents. Apart from the work mentioned above, it has been studied for asymmetric agents (i.e., agents with different entitlements) [9] , for group fairness [3] , beyond additive valuations [4, 12] , with additional constraints [13] , and for agents with externalities [1, 7] .
PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider the fair allocation of M = {1, . . . , m} indivisible items among N = {1, . . . , n} agents with additive valuations, using the popular notion of maximin share (MMS) as our measure of fairness. That is, i j is agent i's value for item j, and i's valuation of any bundle S ⊆ M of items is given by i (S) = j ∈S i j . Denote the set of valuation functions, i : 2 M → R + , as V = ( 1 , . . . , n ). Let N , M, V denote an instance of the fair division problem. Let P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } denote a partition of the items into n bundles (one for each agent). Agent i's maximin share (MMS i ) is the maximum value she can guarantee herself if she is allowed to choose the partition P, on the condition that other agents choose their bundle from the partition before her. Formally, let Π n (M) = {P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } | P i ∩ P j = ∅, ∀i, j; ∪ k P k = M } be the set of all feasible partitions of M into n bundles. Agent i's maximin share is:
We say an allocation A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) is MMS if each agent i receives a bundle A i worth at least her maximin share, i.e.,
PROPERTIES OF MMS ALLOCATION
In this section, we state a few key properties of maximin shares that our algorithm exploits. We note that these are standard results which appear in [2, 4, 6, 11, 12, 16] . We include proofs for completeness.
Average and Scale
P . Suppose for some agent i, MMS i > i (M)/n which means that there exist a partition of M into n bundles where all bundles have value strictly more than 
Ordered Instances
We say that an instance I = N , M, V is ordered if:
In words, in an ordered instance all agents have the same order of preferences over items. Bouveret and Lemaître [6] showed that the ordered instances are worst case. They provided a reduction from any arbitrary instance I = N , M, V to an ordered instance I ′ = N , M, V ′ , and showed that if A ′ is an MMS allocation for I ′ , then one can find an MMS allocation A for I in polynomial time (see Algorithms 1 and 2). Later, Barman and Murthy [4] generalized this result for α approximate MMS allocations. This property is used by [4, 11] to find a 2/3-MMS allocation. Observe that MMS i value of an agent i in instance I and I ′ is the same because MMS value neither depends on the order of the items nor on the valuations of the other agents.
// i * is the agent who has j th item of I ′ in her bundle
Given any instance N , M, V , we can find an ordered instance N , M, V ′ in polynomial time using Algorithm 1. Furthermore, given an α-MMS allocation A ′ for the ordered version N , M, V ′ , using Algorithm 2, we can find α-MMS allocation A for the original instance N , M, V in polynomial time.
P
. Clearly, items in I ′ are sorted by their value and they have the same order for all agents. Also, it takes mn iterations to obtain I ′ . Note that MMS value will remain same in I ′ since MMS value does not depend on the order of items or the valuation of other agent. We prove
Consider the round r of the Algorithm 2 and consider item r from I ′ is in A ′ i . It means that agent i is getting her r th favorite item in A ′ i but now after r − 1 round, exactly r − 1 items are allocated and she will get her favorite item among un-allocated items. Therefore, the item she gets in this round is at least as valuable as the one she was getting in the ordered instance.
Without loss of generality, we can assume agents have the same order of preference over items, i.e., i 1 ≥ i 2 ≥ · · · ≥ im , ∀i ∈ N .
Bag Filling for Low Value Items
Ghodsi et al. [12] showed that if MMS i = 1, ∀i ∈ N and i j ≤ α, ∀i ∈ N , j ∈ M, then we can find a (1 − α) MMS allocation using the bag filling procedure. In this paper, we use bag filling algorithm in a slightly more general way.
Given a δ > 0, let H (δ ) = {j ∈ M | i j ≥ δ, i ∈ N } be the set of high-value items, i.e., every item of H (δ ) is valued at least δ by some agent, and let L(δ ) = M \ H (δ ) be the set of low-value items, i.e., every item of L(δ ) is valued strictly less than δ by all agents.
// pick one low value item arbitrarily 6 T ← T ∪ {j} // add the new to item the bag
If a bundle B k worth at least ∆ − δ for some agent i we can assign it to agent i (if there are ties we choose an agent arbitrarily). If i (B k ) < ∆ − δ for all agents we start adding low value items to B k until someone values it at least ∆ − δ and then we can assign the bag to such an agent. Before adding the last item no one value the bag more than ∆ − δ and the value of the last item is at most δ . Therefore, no agent loses more than ∆ after removing the bag. Therefore, there will be enough low value items to fill all the bags and satisfy all the agents.
Reduction
This useful concept is defined in [12] and later used in [11] . Let µ k i (S) denote the MMS value of agent i when S is the set of items that needs to be divided among k agents (including i). Recall that for the α MMS allocation problem for the fair division instance N , M, V , we want to partition
We call the act of removing a set A i ⊆ M of items and an agent i a valid reduction if
Throughout our algorithm in Section 4, we use this property to remove high value items from the instance and get a smaller instance which, according to Definition 3.7, a 3/4 MMS allocation for the smaller instance gives a 3/4 MMS allocation for the original instance.
Update N , M, V : After each valid reduction with A i and i, we update M ← M \ A(i), N ← N \ {i},
Note that this maintains MMS i ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N after initial normalization (Definition 3.3 and Lemma 3.1). 
10 Make all tentative assignments final
// Section 4.4 and Algorithm 3
ALGORITHM AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we describe the algorithm to find a 3/4 maximin share allocation for a given instance I = N , M, V and its analysis. As it is shown in Section 3, we can without loss of generality work with the normalized valuations so that i (M) = |N | for all agents i ∈ N and assume I to be an ordered instance, i.e., i 1 ≥ i 2 ≥ · · · ≥ i |M | , for all i ∈ N . Also, we fix the order of agents in N such that at each step of the algorithm if there are more than one agent interested in a set of items we assign the set to the one with the lowest index. We maintain the same order among remaining agents after every valid reduction. The main algorithm is given in Algorithm 4. Throughout the algorithm, we use n := |N | and m := |M | to denote respectively the number of agents and number of items of the current instance.
Algorithm 4 has four main parts.
(1) Fixed Assignment (Algorithm 5 and Section 4.1): Recursively removes high value items using valid reductions (Definition 3.7). After each reduction, we have a new smaller instance, and we do not consider the removed items and agents for the rest of the algorithm. (2) Tentative Assignment (Algorithm 6 and Section 4.2): After fixed assignments, the number of high-value items (items worth at least 1/4 to some agent) reduces to at most 2n, and then we tentatively assign items to agents assuming that MMS i = 1, ∀i. We call these assignments tentative because they are valid if the current MMS upper bounds are tight for all agents. (3) Update Upper Bound (Section 4.3): First, we initialize a set of bags (one for each remaining agent) and fill them with the first 2n items in a certain way, and then using these bags, we check if the current MMS upper bound for some agent needs to be updated. If not, then we finalize the tentative assignments and go to the next part. (4) Bag Filling (Algorithm 3 and Section 3.3): We start the bag filling procedure for low-value items on top of the bags which are initialized in the previous part.
After each assignment (fixed or tentative) we perform two actions:
(1) Assign: Assign the items that are being removed to the agent with the lowest index who values these items at least 3/4.
(2) Update N , M, V : Update M and N by removing the items which are assigned and the agents who are satisfied. Also, update the valuations for the remaining agents (see Section 3.4) so that the new MMS upper bound remains 1 for every agent.
Fixed Assignment
Algorithm 5:
, where MMS i ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N Output : Fixed Assignments and Reduced Instance
// Bundles that can be assigned
In this part, we allocate high-value items to agents using Algorithm 5. Let S 1 = {1} (the highest value item for all agents), S 2 = {n, n + 1} (the bundle with n th and (n + 1) th highest valued items for all agents), and S 3 = {2n −1, 2n, 2n +1} (the bundle with (2n −1) th , (2n) th and (2n +1) th highest valued items for all agents). In Algorithm 5, we assign the bundle S ∈ {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 } to the agent i ∈ N for which i (S) ≥ 3/4 (if there are many such agents, we choose the one with the lowest index). Then we update M, N , V (as in Section 3.4) and we repeat this step until no such agent exists. In Lemma 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 we prove that allocating S ∈ {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 } to agent i and removing them from M and N is a valid reduction. . Removing two items {n, n + 1} and agent i with i ({n, n + 1}) ≥ 3/4 is a valid reduction.
P
. Clearly i ({n, n + 1}) ≥ 3/4. In MMS partition of agent i ′ ∈ N \ {i}, there is a bundle with two items from {1, . . . , n + 1} (pigeonhole principle). Let T be a bundle in MMS partition of agent i ′ ( i) that has two items from {1, . . . , n + 1}. Let us exchange these items with items n and n + 1 in other bundles and distribute any remaining item in T among other bundles arbitrarily. Clearly, the value of other bundles does not decrease, and hence the MMS value of the remaining agents after removing {n, n + 1} and agent i will not decrease. 
Tentative Assignment
// n changes with N 3 S 1 ← {1}; S 2 ← {n, n + 1}; S 3 ← {2n − 1, 2n, 2n + 1}; S 4 ← {1, 2n + 1} // Bundles that can be assigned on the condition that MMS i = 1, ∀i ∈ N (see Section 4.1 and 4.2)
S ← the lowest index bundle in {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 } for which i ∈ Γ(S) In this part of the algorithm, we assume that MMS i = 1, ∀i ∈ N , i.e., the actual MMS value for each agent is equal to her current MMS upper bound, and we allocate some bundles using this assumption. This is unlike Section 4.1, where we did not need the MMS value assumption, so the assignments made in Algorithm 5 were final. In the next step, either this assumption works fine and we move to the bag filling process or we detect that there is an an agent i whose MMS value is significantly lower than 1. In the latter case, we update i's MMS upper bound. Recall that we update the MMS upper bound by updating the valuations so that the new MMS upper bound remains 1 for every agent.
Let S 4 = {1, 2n + 1} and S 1 , S 2 , S 3 as defined in Section 4.1. For S ∈ {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 } we check whether there exists an i ∈ N with i (S) ≥ 3/4. If such an agent exists then we tentatively assign S (the lowest index S k if there are multiple S k 's satisfying the condition) to agent i (if there are many such agents we assign S to the one with the lowest index) and we tentatively update M, N , V as we did in Section 4.1. Choosing the lowest index S k makes sure that when S 4 is assigned, then none of S 1 , S 2 , S 3 satisfies the condition. This is essential in proving that assigning S 4 to an agent is a valid reduction in Lemma 4.5.
Note that at the beginning of this part the value of each bundle in {S 1 S 2 , S 3 } for every agent is strictly less than 3/4. However, after removing an agent i with S 4 , it may later trigger a valid reductions with {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 }. then clearly, removing S 4 and agent k is a valid reduction. For the other case, if 1 and 2n + 1 are in two different bundles, then we can make two new bundles, one with {1, 2n + 1} and another with all the remaining items of the two bundles. Clearly, the value of the bundle without {1, 2n + 1} is at least one, and hence this is a valid reduction.
Updating MMS Upper Bound
The goal of this section is to update the MMS upper bound for some agent, if needed, before we start the bag-filling process. Recall that n = |N | is the number of agents in the current instance, and it keeps changing with N . Recall that 1 = {1, . . . , n} and = {1, . . . , 2n} denote the set of highest valued n and 2n items respectively, and 2 = \ 1 . First we initialize n bags using the first 2n items as follows.
Each bag contains one item from 1 and one item from 2 such that from B 1 to B n value of items from 1 decreases and value of items from 2 increases. We divide the agents into two types:
• Type 1: i ∈ N : i (B k ) ≤ 1 for all bundles.
• Type 2: i ∈ N : i (B k ) > 1 for some bundle(s). If all agents are in Type 1, then we do not need to update the MMS upper bounds, and we can start bag filling. Otherwise, we need to analyze Type 2 agents more thoroughly. Definition 4.6. For a Type 2 agent i, define
In words, x i is the least total value needed to make all bundles in L i at least 3/4. We partition Type 2 agents further into two sub-types as follows:
If there are no Type 2B agents, then we do not need to update the MMS upper bounds, and we can start bag filling. Otherwise, we will show that MMS value for each Type 2B agent is strictly less than 1, and we find a new upper bound for their MMS values. We begin by showing a few results. 4.11. Consider a Type 2 agent i and let P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) be her MMS partition of items. If MMS i = 1 then there exist a bundle P k ∈ P such that i (P k \ ) > 2/8.
P
. If there exists a bundle P k with exactly one item j from , then i (P k \ ) = 1 − i j > 2/8 because value of every item is less than 3/4. For the other case, each bundle has exactly two items from , which implies that one of the bundles, say P k , has two items j 1 , j 2 from the set {n} ∪ 2 .
12. For a Type 2 agent i with MMS i = 1, there exists a MMS partition P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) where no bundle P k has two items {j 1 , j 2 } such that i j 1 , i j 2 > 5/8.
. We show that if there are two items with value (for agent i) more than 5/8 in a bundle of MMS partition, then we can construct another MMS partition in which all items with value more than 5/8 are in different bundles. Suppose P k has two items j 1 and j 2 with value more than 5/8, then Corollary 4.4 implies that there must exist another bundle P k ′ for which max j ∈P k ′ i j < 3/8. If there exists a partition Q 1 k ′ and Q 2 k ′ of items in P k ′ such that value of each Q 1 k ′ and Q 2 k ′ is at least 3/8, then we can rearrange items in P k ∪P k ′ and make two new bundles ({j 1 } ∪Q 1 k ′ ) and ({j 2 } ∪Q 2 k ′ ). Clearly, the value of each bundle is at least one and each has exactly one item with value more than 5/8.
If no such Q 1 k ′ and Q 2 k ′ exist, then we claim that there exists a partition of P k ′ into three sets with each value less than 3/8. We can find this partition by making three empty sets and sorting the items in P k ′ from high to low value and adding them to the bundle with the lowest value one by one. For a contradiction, suppose one of the three sets has value more than 3/8, then the sum of the value of other two sets should be less than 3/8 because otherwise, they make a partition of two with each value more than 3/8. This means that at least one of the sets must have a value less than 3/16. This implies that the value of the other bag before adding the last item must be less than 3/16 and the last item also should value less than 3/16, which is a contradiction. Therefore, there exists a partition Q 1 k ′ , Q 2 k ′ and Q 3 k ′ of P k ′ such that each value less than 3/8. According to Lemma 4.11, there exists a bundle Pk such that i (Pk \ ) > 2/8. Let i (Pk ) = 1 + δ for some δ ≥ 0. Observe that P k ′ cannot be same as Pk and P k , otherwise we would have made two bundles earlier, each with value at least 1 and exactly one item more than 5/8. We make three bags:
The value of each of bag 1 and bag 2 is at most 9/8 and the value of bag 3 is at most 9/8 + δ . The total value of all items in P k , P k ′ and Pk is at least 3+2/8+δ . We sort the remaining items in decreasing order and add them one by one to a bag with the lowest value. Since the value of the last item added to each bag has a value of at most 1/8 (from Lemma 4.10), each bag has a value of at least 1 and it has at most one item with value more than 5/8.
Next, we show that MMS value for a Type 2B agent is strictly lower than 1, and then we show how to update it. Fix a Type 2B agent a. For simplicity, until the end of this section, when we use value of an item or a bundle, we mean their value for agent a (unless mentioned otherwise). Let P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) be a MMS partition of agent a. For contradiction, assume that MMS a = 1. For simplicity, we use x instead of x a and l instead of l a (Definition 4.6).
We manipulate the partition P: First, for each B i = {j, j ′ } with 3/4 ≤ a (B i ) ≤ 1, if j ∈ P k and j ′ ∈ P k ′ , then we turn P k and P k ′ into two new bundles {j, j ′ } and (P k ∪ P k ′ ) \ {j, j ′ }. We have
Hence, we can assume that for each B i L a ∪K a (Definition 4.6), there exists a P k = B i . Second, we re-enumerate the bundles in P such that
• P 1 , . . . , P t 1 be the ones that has an item, say j, of value more than 5/8 for agent a and a (B j ) < 3/4 (t 1 such bundles), • P t 1 +1 , . . . , P t 2 be the ones that has an item, say j, of value more than 5/8 for agent a and a (B j ) > 1 (Observe that there are k a such bundles, so t 2 − t 1 = k a ), • P t 3 +1 , . . . , P t n be the ones for which P k = B k ′ and 3/4 ≤ a (B k ′ ) ≤ 1, • P t 2 +1 , . . . , P t 3 be the remaining bundles (Observe that t 3 = l a + k a ). Definition 4.13. Define := ak ′ where k ′ is the highest value item in the set {j ∈ 2 ∩ B k , B k ∈ K a }. Observe that 2/8 < < 3/8.
The claim follows from the construction of B k 's (2), and the fact that each bundle of K a has an item with value more than 5/8. L 4.15. If t 1 = 0, then for agent a, we have
where z = max{2k a − |
In k:B k ∈K a B k there are exactly 2k a items from . If there are at least 2k a in t 2 t =t 1 +1 P t ∪ then z = 0. On the other hand, if there are 2k a − z items in t 2 t =t 1 +1 P t ∩ , then it means that there are at least z bundles in P t 1 +1 , . . . , P t 2 with exactly one item from . Each of these bundles need more than 1/4 value of items from M \ to become 1.
Next, if z = 0, then all bundles in {P t 2 +1 , . . . , P t 3 } need at least x + l/4 value of items from M \ to become 1 because the value of each item in the bundles of L a is at least (follows from Definition 4.13 and the construction of B k 's in (2)). If z > 0, then all bundles in {P t 2 +1 , . . . , P t 3 } need at least x + l/4 − z value of items from M \ to become one because each of the z items has value at most (Lemma 4.14). Therefore, in total, there should be at least x + l/4 − z + z/4 value of items from M \ in {P t 1 +1 , . . . , P t 3 }.
Further, in case z is large such that the value of x + l/4 − z + z/4 is negative, we still need z/4 value of items from M \ to make all bundles in {P t 1 +1 , . . . , P t 2 } one.
P . Using Lemma 4.16 there are two cases for the maximum of x + l/4 − z + z/4 and z/4. We prove the claim for each case separately.
8l . Using these, we get
The last inequality follows because (3l − 4x) > 0 (Lemma 4.7). This implies a (M \ ) ≥ x + l/8.
Case 2: Suppose x + l/4 − z + z/4 ≤ z/4. Then, using (4), we have
Next, we handle the general case when t 1 > 0. Let L 1 ⊆ L a be the set of bags, which have one item with value more than 5/8, and L 2 = L a \ L 1 . Clearly, |L 1 | = t 1 and |L 2 | = l − t 1 . T 4.18. For agent a, we have
P . Let min = B k ∈L 1 B k ∩ 2 . Then, we have aj < 1/8, ∀j ∈ min because these items are bagged with an item value more than 5/8 and together they have value less than 6/8. Therefore,
, and x 2 := x − x 1 . For agent a, we can treat items of min as low value items so we will prove:
Since a ( min ) is at most t 1 /8, (8) directly implies the theorem. Let us call items in (M \ ) ∪ min as filler items (each has value < 1/8) and items in \ min as base items (each has value > 1/4). In P, recall that each of {P 1 , . . . , P t 1 } contains a base item whose value is at least the maximum of all the items in the remaining bundles. Further, if there are two base items in any bundle P k in {P 1 , . . . , P t 1 }, then a (P k ) > 1. If each bundle in {P 1 , . . . , P t 1 } has exactly one base item (t 1 bundles in total) then items of value at least x 1 + t 1 /4 are needed to make all these bundles at least 1. This, together with Theorem 4.17, proves the bound. On the other hand, if there are more than t 1 base items in {P 1 , . . . , P t 1 }, then for each extra base item j, there are two cases. If j comes from B k ∈ L 2 then clearly, x 1 will decrease by less than aj but x 2 will increase by aj , so the bound only improves. For the other case, if j comes from B k ∈ K a then it will make B k \ {j} to need more low value items than the bundle in {P 1 , . . . , P t 1 } who gets j to become one, so x 1 will only increase and x 2 stays same, and hence the bound only improves. This completes the proof. In Algorithm 4, as long as there exists a Type 2B agent we do not fix the tentative allocations since these allocations are valid only if MMS i = 1, ∀i. Therefore, the upper bound of MMS value for Type 2B agents needs to be updated. Let k and k ′ be respectively the maximum valued items from and M \ which were not tentatively assigned. We undo the tentative assignments before updating the MMS value. 
. Suppose MMS i = β and β > α. We have
From this, we can conclude that if we normalize the valuation of agent i with respect to β, she will not be satisfied in Fixed-Assignment. Further, the bundle S 4 , if it is tentative assigned, (see Algorithm 6 and Lemma 4.5) has value at most MMS i because each bundle in {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 } is worth strictly less than 3/4 to all agents, and hence all tentative assignments are valid reductions. Also, since β > α 4 , no new pair that form S 4 will satisfy her. Furthermore, since β > α 5 , agent i will remain in Type 2B even after we normalize her valuation with respect to β. It implies that MMS i < β (Corollary 4.19) which is a contradiction.
We pick an agent i with the lowest index in the set of Type 2B agents and we update i's valuation as i j ← i j α , ∀j ∈ M and repeat. In Theorem 4.24, we show that the number of updates cannot happen more than n 3 times.
Bag Filling
Let N ′ , M ′ , V ′ be the set of agents and items remaining at the beginning of this step. Let n = |N ′ |. Next, we run a bag filling procedure on bags in B = (B 1 , . . . , B n ), constructed as in (2) .
Value of each assigned bag in the bag filling process is at most 1 for a Type 1 agent and at most 7/8 for a Type 2 agent.
P
. Note that the value of each bundle is less than 3/4, and i j < 1/8 for j ∈ M \ for every Type 2 agent i. Before adding the last item, the value of every bag is less than 3/4 for any agent, and the last item cannot increase this value by more than 1/8 and 1/4 for Type 2 and Type 1 agents respectively. This proves the claim. 
P . For a Type 2 agent i, the value of any bag in K i is less than 9/8 (Theorem 4.9) and the value of any bag which is not in K i ∪ L i is at most 1 (Definition 4.6). The total value of the items in M is at least n so we have: 
. For Type 1 agents, the claim follows using Throrem 3.6 with ∆ = 1 and δ = 1/4. And, for Type 2 agents, it follows using Lemmas 4.22 and definition of Type 2B agent with ∆ = 7/8 and δ = 1/8. To bound the number of iterations of the while loop, we upper bound the number of times it is run for a particular Type 2B agent, say a. Consider the first iteration when a is the lowest index Type 2B agent, then if we update a's valuation due to α = {α 1 , α 2 , α 3 } (see Section 4.3), then a gets a fixed assignment after this iteration, and we will not see her again. If we update a's valuation due to α = α 4 , then in the future iterations, it will not become a Type 2B agent unless another Type 2B agent ends her iteration due to α = {α 1 , α 2 , α 3 }. Clearly, this can happen at most O(n) time. Finally, if we update a's valuation due to α = α 5 , then it will not become a Type 2B agent again unless another Type 2B agent ends her iteration due to α = {α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , α 4 }. This can happen at most O(n 2 ) time. Therefore, the maximum number of iterations of the while loop is at most O(n 3 ). Since each iteration takes at most O(n 2 m) arithmetic operations, Algorithm 4 takes O(n 5 m) time.
Running Time
Algorithm 1 takes O(mn logm) time to make the original instance ordered by creating a sorted list of items for each agent. Next, we show that Algorithm 2 can be implemented in O(mn) time. Initialize a binary array A of size m to all ones. A[j] indicates whether item j is available or not; 1 means available. Each agent has a sorted list of items from the Algorithm 1. From the solution of the ordered instance using Algorithm 4, we can create an array B of size m, where B[j] stores the agent who is assigned the item j. Observe that B can be constructed in O(m) time. Then, for each item j from 1 to m, we get the agent B[j] who is assigned j, and then we try to give B[j] the highest item in her list. If her highest item is not available, which we can check from A, then we delete this item from B[j]'s list, and move down to the next highest item and repeat until we reach at an available item. We give this item to B[j] and mark it assigned in A. Since the size of each agent's list is m, the total time is O(mn). Using Algorithms 1 and 2 together with Algorithm 4, the running time of the entire procedure is O(nm(n 4 + log m)) =Õ(n 5 m).
CONCLUSIONS
We have given a simple polynomial time algorithm for computing a 3/4-approximate maximin share (MMS) allocation. For each agent, we first use the average value, that is the value of all items divided by the number of agents, as an upper bound of her MMS value, and then we greedily assign one, two, and three high-value items. Since these assignments do not decrease the MMS values of the remaining agents, they are final. After each assignment, we update the MMS value based on the new average. This reduces the number of high-value items to at most twice the number of remaining agents. Then, we initialize a set of bags, one for each remaining agent, and put all highvalue items in these bags in a certain way. Then, we show that if the MMS upper bound of each agent is tight enough, then we can fill the bags with the low-value items such that each agent gets a bag worth at least 3/4 of her MMS value. For the other case, we update the MMS upper bound of some agent.
It could be worth exploring whether the approach extends to obtaining a 4/5 MMS allocation. Such an extension would be challenging because after the initial greedy assignments, there will be 3n high-value items, and this would make the process of initializing the bag filling procedure harder due to too many items to handle and also the value of some bags might exceed significantly more than 1.
